Vertical restraints

screencasts

  • The following video gives an overview of what to expect in this lecture on Vertical Restraints:

part 1

  • We start discussing intra-brand competition, an example of double marginalization and retail services are considered:

part 2

  • Now we take a look at an example of foreclosure where vertical restraints reduce welfare:

part 3

  • In this video consider inter-brand competition; what happens without integration and if exlusive dealing is allowed:

part 4

  • We introduce the effects of vertical agreements on competition and start discussing exlusive territories, leverage & foreclosure and the Chicago school argument in more detail:

part 5

  • Next we study a model of naked exlusion by Rasmusen et al. (1991, AER):

part 6

  • Then we look at a model by Aghion and Bolton (1987, AER) on contracts as barrier to entry:

part 7

  • In the last video we study the model by Bernheim and Whinston (1998,JPE) on exclusive dealing and conclude:

part 8

exercises

From the exercises of this lecture, we discuss question 2 in class.

python

In the python file for this lecture, we consider public and private contracts: